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In The 
SUPREME COURT 
Of The 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID RUSSELL and EILEEN RUSSELL, 
his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Responden ts, 
STERLING B. MARTELL d/b/a MARTELL 
HOLDING COMPANY, et al, and 
GRANT C. MILLS, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
ANSWER TO 
Supreme Court 
No. 18160 
RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
This Court's decision in this case held that the 
Russells, in seeking a default judgment, did not submit evidence 
as required by Rule 55(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
show damages sustained under Section 61-l-22(l)(b), U.C.A. That 
section requires the submission of evidence as to the 
"consideration paid for the security," "reasonable attorney's 
fees" and "the amount of any income received on the security." 
The Court's opinion stated that "although it appears that a 
hearing was held, it dealt only with the reasonableness of the 
attorney's fees to be awarded the plaintiffs." Based on the 
failure to submit evidence on "the consideration paid for the 
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security" and the "income received on the security" and the 
failure to determine damages based on such evidence, this court 
reversed the judgment entered below and remanded the case for 
further proceedings. 
The Respondents' Petition for Rehearing 1s based upon 
their claims that: 
1. The lower court actually heard evidence as to the 
amount paid for the note and the income received thereon; and 
2. The amount paid for the note was $55,200.00 
because the note recites that amount as the principal which is 
to be paid. 
The first claim made by respondents is absolutely 
contrary to the prior statements of respondents' attorney that 
"the question of attorney's fees was the only matter which 
required the taking of evidence." A reading of the Brief of 
Respondents, pages 20 through 23, makes it very clear that 
respondents produced no evidence as to any matter other than 
attorney's fees. It is stated there that ''respondents went 
before a district court judge to obtain their judgment and to 
make a proper showing on attorney's fees," "at the hearing it 
was necessary to produce evidence as to attorney's fees," "the 
question of attorney's fees was the only matter which required 
the taking of evidence,'' ''the only amount claimed in the 
complaint requiring evidence was attorney's fees," "the record 
shows that a hearing was held and evidence was taken as to the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees," and "a hearing in fact was 
held as to attorney's fees and their exists in the present 
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record no evidence that the court falsely stated it had taken 
evidence, or that the amount awarded is not reasonable." 
Respondents' attorney also states in the Brief of Respondents 
that "it is not necessary for a court to take evidence as to the 
merits of the case since to do so would require a trial on the 
default judgment." It is quite clear from these statements that 
respondents submitted only evidence as to attorney's fees and 
did not submit evidence as to any other matter because they 
considered it unnecessary. 
No reporter was present and no record was made of the 
evidence submitted by respondents. Yet, respondents' attorney 
now claims, contrary to all prior statements in this case, that 
evidence was presented to the court as to the amount paid for 
the note and the income received thereon. This claim is based 
upon the affidavit of David Eccles Hardy (Exh. D to Respondents' 
Petition for Rehearing) stating that he, the attorney, produced 
for the judge the original promissory note and that he 
"testified" that "to the best of my information and belief" 
$55,200.00 had been paid by respondents for the note and that 
his "understanding" was that no income had been received on the 
note. He also testified that $5,000.00 was reasonable for 
attorney's fees. One might have questioned whether the 
attorney's fee was reasonable on a default judgment but, at 
least, Mr. Hardy was competent to testify as to attorney's fees. 
He was definitely not competent to testify as to the amount paid 
for the note and the income received thereon. 
-3-
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In the first place, as the attorney for the 
respondents, he is restricted from testifying in the case. 
Code of Professional Responsibility, Cannon 5, E.C. 5-9 and 
5-10. If he had firsthand knowledge of the facts to which he 
claims to have testified, he should have resigned from the case 
before becoming a witness. In the second place, it is quite 
obvious that he did not have firsthand knowledge of these facts 
since he based his testimony on "information and belief" and his 
"understanding" and, at best, his testimony was hearsay. The 
intent of Rule 55(b)(2) is not to have the attorney tell the 
judge what he thinks or what others have told him, but to have 
the plaintiffs come in and be sworn and testify and show 
evidence of what they paid and what they received. 
Furthermore, if the judge saw and read the promissory 
note, it would have been obvious that the so-called "testimony" 
of Mr. Hardy was false. The note provides that the maker 
promises to pay $55,200.00 on maturity of the note. It does not 
say that $55,200.00 was paid for the note--only that $55,200.00 
is to be paid on maturity. In the blank in the upper right-hand 
corner of the note, where it is customary to set forth the 
amount of a note, as was obviously the intent on this particular 
note, the figure of $48,000.00 is typed. Underneath this blank 
are the words "Six Months", which one would reasonable interpret 
to be the term of the note. When one applies the stated 
interest rate of thirty (30%) percent per annum, or two and 
one-half (2.5%) percent per month, to $48,000.00 for six months, 
the result is $7,200.00, which, when added to the $48,000.00, is 
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$55,200.00. While one might reasonably question the validity of 
such a note on the grounds of vagueness, one can only conclude 
that the amount paid for the note was $48,000.00 and the amount 
to be repaid in six months, by the maker, was $55,200.00. What 
other possible meaning does the figure $48,000.00 have? There 
is none. 
Thus, the "information and belief" and the 
"understanding" of Mr. Hardy were false and, therefore, his 
testimony was false. His incompetent, hearsay evidence was 
contrary to the only competent "best evidence" before the judge. 
The best evidence was the note itself which recites that 
$48,000.00 was the amount paid for the note. 
Why respondents assert that $55,200.00 was paid for 
the note and try to support that by the uncertain, vague and 
incompetent affidavit of Mr. Hardy, when it is known to the 
parties and their attorneys that only $48,000.00 was paid for 
the note, is beyond belief. The attempt to "create" a record, 
where none existed, has emphasized the contradiction between 
respondents' present claims and the facts. 
Likewise, the parties and their attorneys know that 
respondents received $16,800.00 as income on the note and did 
not disclose that fact to the lower court. The injustice of the 
procedure followed by the respondents is clear. They, however, 
justify themselves by stating, on page 14 of their Petition for 
Rehearing: 
The great risk of defaulting i_s that the amount 
claimed in the Complaint and the amount found as 
damages may be a sum greater than would have been 
awarded had the trial court had the benefit of 
the defendant's knowledge by way of countervailing 
testimony. 
-5-
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In other words, the plaintiff may take advantage of you 
if you don't answer the complaint. That risk has now become a 
reality. The purpose of Rule 55(b)(2), in requiring testimony 
to support the plaintiffs' claims of damages, even on a default 
judgment, could not be better highlighted than it is by the 
actions of the respondents in this case. 
Respondents further state, on page 13 of their 
Petition for Rehearing, that: 
If defendant Mills had not defaulted ... , he 
may very well have placed before the trial 
court evidence that less than $55,200.00 had 
been paid by the Russells, or that some income 
had been received by the Russells. 
Indeed, Mills could have done so and would have done 
so but the plaintiff, David Russell, told Mills "that he wasn't 
after me but was just after Sterling Martell and Martell Holding 
Corp.'' and agreed that Mills should not have to take any action. 
(See Affidavit of Mills attached to Appellant's Petition and 
Brief for Rehearing). 
This court's reversal of the judgment was entirely 
appropriate under these circumstances. However, with the 
numerous affidavits which have been filed in this case, 
attempting to assert what was said or done on various occasions 
in the case, it should be obvious that the only way to fairly 
and properly consider all of the facts is to order a full hearing 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on the merits. Therefore, appellant requests this court to deny 
Respondents' Petition for Rehearing and to grant Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing in order to allow this case to go to 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
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